Abstract-Power systems are the typical cyber-physical systems in which the closed-loop hierarchical control systems (HCSs) are widely used to ensure their stable and safe operation. To describe the coupling operation mechanism of an HCS and power grid by expanding current steady-state power flow analysis theory, we propose an information-energy flow model and develop a matrix-based computational approach. With the help of the methods, we can directly calculate the mutual influence of the cyber and physical parts. Since the mechanism of power flow computation is mature, we focus on the cyber side, proposing an information-flow-oriented network model as well as a matrixbased computation method for its information flow. In particular, we develop a minimum-cut-set-based partition and equivalence method to address a complex cyber network with non-linearity issues associated with data processing. Subsequently, we discuss cyber-physical sensitivity and vulnerability issues. In the case study, we calculate the information-energy flow of an IEEE 14-node system with real time-voltage stability monitoring and control application and compare the results with simulation results. The similarity of the results between the two methods verifies the effectiveness of our approach.
Such systems deserve our utmost attention because their cyber network vulnerabilities may lead to inappropriate feedback control actions on physical power grids [4] , [5] , which could negatively affect their stable and safe operation. For example, failure of the state estimation (SE) program was believed to be a direct cause of the serious Northeast blackout in the USA and Canada in 2003 [6] . Also, hacker attacks have been verified as the core reason for the Ukraine blackout in December 2015.
A. Related Works
Currently, emerging power system accidents caused by cyber-side vulnerabilities have drawn substantial attention from both industry and academia regarding cyber security issues associated with power systems [7] . Particularly, as a scalable and pervasive communication infrastructure is crucial for a smart grid, both the safety and privacy issues should be respected during its construction and operation [8] - [12] . In 2012, Chen et al. [9] have investigated several typical smart attack scenarios in smart grid communication networks and adopted the percolation-based connectivity in statistic mechanics to evaluate the network robustness. By introducing the idea of detection sensitivity, the authors have also designed a fusion-based defense strategy against data attacks. Similarly, Li et al. [12] have elaborated on the challenges and countermeasures of cyber attacks in smart grid, upon which sophisticated attack behaviors have been learnt. For secure energy management service provision, He et al. [13] have established a secure communication procedure as well as privacy-preserving frame among smart grids for numerous types of participants. Furthermore, some other researchers have also explored cyber security under some specific scenarios, e.g., wireless smart grids [14] , power reservation [15] , and optimal charging for electric vehicles [16] .
To evaluate how much cyber contingencies may affect the physical operation as well as the cyber-physical security/reliability of a power system, numerous researchers have proposed detailed models for the whole cyber-physical system and studied the action modes of various cyber events in power systems [11] , [17] - [20] . Based on such results, some researchers have designed mechanisms or testbeds performing time sequence simulations to analyze the cyberphysical impacts of such events under different scenarios [7] , [21] - [23] . Admittedly, the simulation approaches adequately mimic reality and could provide accurate results under any conditions. But the time-sequential or event-triggered mechanisms developed are extremely complex and timeconsuming, hence not suitable for analytical assessment.
B. Motivation and Contributions
As mentioned before, current simulation mechanism on cyber-side vulnerabilities in power systems [7] , [21] - [23] are often extremely complex and time-consuming, hence not suitable for analytical assessment. As the time scales of HCSs are mostly second or minute, far longer than those of electro-magnetic transient or communication simulation, it is reasonable to consider the operation state of an HCS in a control period as steady-state. To make a better tradeoff between the computation complexity and accuracy in cyberphysical assessment, in this paper, we expand current steadystate power flow analysis theory by integrating cyber-physical coupling features of HCSs.
Based on the information-flow-oriented network(IFO network) model of the cyber-physical interdependency of an HCS presented in [5] , we establish a theoretical framework for information-energy flow modeling, calculation and assessment for a cyber-physical power system with HCSs. To reduce the computation complexity, we simplify a complex cyberphysical power system and generate a matrix-based flow model by extracting its key features of the interaction between the information and energy. In this way, the operation state of a cyber-physical power system can be rapidly assessed by conducting simple matrix calculations rather than complex timesequential simulations. To further improve the computation efficiency for cyber-physical assessment, by extending current power system sensitivity theory, we propose a cyber-physical sensitivity index that describes the extent of the interaction between the cyber and physical quantities. Such index can be utilized in a system-wide N-1 contingency scan and cyberphysical vulnerability/significance assessment.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized below: 1) Generate a simplified but accurate information-energy flow model that describes the cyber-physical state of a power system based on the previously proposed IFO network model by extracting its key features; 2) Propose a path-branch-incidence-matrix-based calculation approach as well as a partition and equivalence method for the information-energy flow with high computation efficiency; and 3) Propose a cyber-physical sensitivity index and discuss the way utailize it to perform a rapid assessment. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section III, we introduce a general model of informationenergy flow. In Section IV, we review and expand our research on IFO network modeling. In Section V, we discuss the information flow calculation. In Section VI, we discuss the cyberphysical sensitivity and significance index. In Section VII, we perform an information-energy-flow-based study on an existing HCS, RT-VSMAC, and compare our results to the simulation results, which verifies the effectiveness of our methodology. Finally, in Section VIII, we summarize our modeling and calculation theory.
II. ARCHITECTURE OF INFORMATION-ENERGY FLOW MODEL
As mentioned in the introduction, even though the cyber network of an HCS may be extraordinarily complex, the key features of a cyber-physical power system can be regarded as the interaction between the information flow and energy flow. The operation of a cyber-physical power system can be considered as a physical-cyber iterative process, where the energy flow acts as the data origin of the information flow, and the information flow determines the distribution of the energy flow. Referring to some current EMS applications, a control period should be much longer than the communication or computation time to ensure reliable control. Therefore, the cyber-physical state of a power system can be described as an approximately steady-state information-energy flow after discretizing it by the control period.
The architecture of the proposed information-energy flow model can be divided into four parts, which are presented in Fig. 1 below:
According to Fig. 1 , Part 1 and Part 3 describe the physical and cyber sides of the system, respectively, while Part 2 and Part 4 represent the coupling mechanisms of the two sides. By iteratively computing this model, the operation state of the whole system in different control periods can be calculated. The detailed descriptions are presented below.
A. Energy Flow
The energy flow model is exactly the same as the power flow equation. According to [25] , for an K 0 -bus power network, the physical-side energy flow equation is proposed as follows:
where Y is the K 0 ¢ K 0 bus admittance matrix, U is the K 0 ¢1 bus voltage vector and S is the K 0 ¢ 1 complex bus power vector. S ¦ and U ¦ is the conjugate of S and U.
Equation (1) includes K 0 non-linear power flow equations in complex number that correspond to different buses. Define P i and Q i as the active and reactive power output for bus i . The i th equation should be
where bold j indicates the imaginary part. j È i represents all buses connected to bus i . If the node voltages are expressed in polar form with:
we have
Equation (4) can be rewritten in the following form:
where vectors g and e represent the conductance and susceptance of the branches, correspondingly. The power flow model proposed in equation (5) is a set of 2K 0 non-linear algebraic equations in similar forms. To simplify the expression, power engineers and researchers have classified all the variables/parameters of power flow model into five categories when establishing power-flow based problems [25] : ➢ Network device parameters, η, which may include resistances, reactances, and charging capacitances of transmission lines. In our research, we define
➢ Network structure, A, which can be represented by the node-branch incidence matrix A. Specifically, the bus admittance matrix Y (see equation (1)) can be generated based on η and A:
➢ Disturbance variables, D, which refers to disturbance variables that are determined by the demands of users, thus usually uncontrollable. Typical disturbance variables include active and reactive powers at load buses, i.e.,
➢ Controllable variables, u, are usually different for different HCSs. For example, an AVC system manipulates reactive power, while an AGC system adjusts active power output. u may include: active powers and terminal voltages (or reactive powers) of generators; controlling voltages (or reactive powers) of condensers and other adjustable reactive power sources, etc. ➢ State variables, x, which should be determined if the aforementioned four categories of variables are given. In this paper, x includes voltage magnitudes U, phase θ , active power P and reactive power Q as well as the switch states π C,R of capacitors/reactors for each bus
Based on such classification of the variables, power flow equations (equation (5)) can be rewritten in the following simpler form:
Equation (10) is a standard form for expanded power flow problems.
In a real power system, closed-loop control can be regarded as a discrete process. That is, the controllable variable vector u should not be changed in one control period. Therefore, equation (10) can be modified to f ÔxÔtÕ, uÔt 0 Õ, DÔtÕ, η, AÕ 0 t È Ô t 0 , t 0 t×, (11) where t is the time scale, and (t 0 , t 0 t] represents a control period.
For easier calculation, we can discretize equation (11) by the time unit t: f ÔxÔN 1Õ, uÔNÕ, DÔN 1Õ, η, AÕ 0, (12) in which N represents a discrete time scale. In this paper, we utilize this equation to represent the energy flow model on the physical side.
B. Energy Flow
Information Flow In this step, physical state quantities are converted to digital signals by numerous measurement terminals. Assuming that there are K measurement devices (MDs) in total and the data output of the k th substation (1 k K ) is defined as column vector z k , the model of this step can be described as a data mapping from state variable x (obtained in equation (12)) to the measurement results z k : (13) where N is the time scale for discretization. Mapping matrix E k only consists of zeros and ones if no cyber contingency occurs, in which each element 1 corresponds to a measured quantity.
Here we propose an example to illustrate the implementation of this model. An RTU (remote terminal unit) in a substation could measure local voltage magnitudes, active/reactive power and switch state (no phase angle θ ), thus for the k th substation (1 k K ), we have:
Assume
The general model of this step can be described as xÔNÕ zÔNÕ E ¤ xÔNÕ.
(16)
C. Information Flow
As discussed previously, in this step, an HCS generates control signals based on the measurement results z. Assume that there are q control terminals, and the control signal generated for the l th device (1 l L) is represented by column vector y l . Define
If the cyber network and module functions of an HCS are known, the unified model of this step can be expressed as a data mapping from z to y, the equation of which is zÔNÕ yÔNÕ ÔzÔNÕÕ, (18) where operator is determined by the characteristics of the HCS.
However, the cyber network of an HCS, consisting of a multitude of linear/non-linear cyber modules, may be extraordinarily complex, thus obtaining its information flow mapping becomes the key challenge for constructing informationenergy flow model, which will be specifically discussed in next two sections. In Section IV, we review our previous research on information-flow-oriented network (IFO network) model, which simplifies HCSs' complex cyber networks into directed graphs while retaining their external characteristics to the physical side. Afterwards, in Section V, we explore the mechanism to calculate information flow mapping based on such model.
D. Information Flow Energy Flow
In this step, the control commands generated in the previous step are executed in the physical power system, such as switch control and load shedding. Therefore, this step can be modeled as a data mapping from y to u (controllable variables, see equation (12)), which is presented as yÔNÕ uÔNÕ
ÔyÔNÕÕ.
In most HCS applications, operator should be linear, e.g., 1) a power plant receives the target values of active power output and terminal voltages, then controls the generator accordingly ( is an identity mapping from the target values to the new operation state of the generator); and 2) a substation receives the commands on its capacitors/reactors' switches ( is a linear mapping from the digital signals to the reactive power compensation). However, can also be non-linear sometime. For example, if a signal is issued for adjusting the tap ratio of a ULTC transformer, the mapping from such signal (tap ratio) to the parameter change of physical power grid might be non-linear.
In consideration of both conditions, hereinafter, we define symbol ¤ as generalized multiplication among numbers, vectors, matrices and operators. With such definition, equation (18) and equation (19) can be reformulated as
E. General Information-Energy Flow Model and Calculation Challenge
Substituting equations (16) and (20) into equation (12), we can summarize the general model for information-energy flow (21) based on which we can quantitatively calculate the sequential operation states of a cyber-physical power system in different control periods.
In this information-energy flow model, mappings f , E and can be constructed according to the information of a given system, however, is not easy to obtain. Therefore, in the following two sections, we specifically discuss the modeling and calculation for the information flow .
III. INFORMATION-FLOW-ORIENTED NETWORK MODEL FOR HCS
In order to calculate the information flow mapping in equation (18), we first need to properly construct an analytical model for an HCS. Therefore, in this section, we discuss the method to simplify an HCS's cyber network into an information-flow-oriented network (IFO network) model.
In the power flow model, transmission lines are modeled as branches, and each line's property can be represented by its admittance, i.e., the complex proportion between its voltage and current. Referring to these coefficients, we can similarly abstract a cyber module or process into a simple mapping relation from its data input to its data output. By modeling such data inputs or outputs as data nodes and modeling cyber modules as directed branches, an HCS can be described as a directed graph that is similar to a power network model [5] , which is defined as its IFO network model.
The devices in an HCS are arranged hierarchically, thus its IFO network model should also be a hierarchical tree, where the roots correspond to the data origin, i.e., the measurement results z (see equation (15)), and the leaves correspond to final control commands y (see equation (17) ) that affect the physical operation. Define the set of the rest of the data nodes as w Øw 1 , . . . , w r Ù and define the branch set as
The entire IFO network can be described as G Ø z, w, y; BÙ in our model. Similar to other networks, the characteristics of an IFO network are determined by two factors: module properties, represented by IFO branch models, and network topology.
A. Branch Model
As stated before, an IFO branch represents a real module's function and can be modeled as a data mapping from its data input to its data output. From the perspective of information flow, IFO branches can be divided into three categories:
a. Data-transmission (DT) branch, which represents data exchange between different cyber units. Without contingencies, this branch should implement a one-to-one mapping; b. Data-processing (DP) branch, which represents a calculation or optimization process. In this branch, the input data are transformed into the output data by a particular function; c. Data-pool, which represents the process during which some modules' output data are assembled and then input to other modules. It describes the coupling relationships of different data nodes and should be modeled as mappings from its input data node(s) to output data node(s).
The mathematical models of the three types of branches are presented as follows:
In equations (11) Considering that computations on sets may reduce the efficiency, we can reformulate the data-pool branch model in equation (24) as the following form
where
and v out m are column vectors. In this way, the output of a data-pool can be expressed as an algebraic sum of some equivalent single input, single output (SISO) branches instead of a union set. Detailed information on the modeling approach and examples for these three branches can be found in [5] .
B. Network Topology
The topology of an IFO network is defined as the incidence relations between their data nodes and branches. Since the network model can be viewed as a hierarchical tree, we use a path-branch incidence matrix to describe its topology, which has been widely applied in distribution power flow computation.
For any information node v È y w, its path-branch incidence matrix, denoted as T v , describes the incidence relations between all directed paths ending at v, and the information branches, in which each column vector corresponds to a path. Defining the quantity of such paths as M v , the order of T v should be N ¢ M v (N is the quantity of the branches). The elements of T v are defined as
in which t v Ôi, j Õ represents the element in the i th row and j th column of matrix T v . In addition, as the information flow of a path is mainly determined by the data of its starting node, we also propose a path-starting-node incidence matrix S v to describe their relations, with elements defined as follows:
In equation (16), the condition for s v Ô j, kÕ 1 is that node k is the starting node of path j . If the structure of anIFO network is known, the path-branch and path-startingnode incidence matrices can be generated automatically. For the convenience of the ordered addition for the informationenergy flow, which will be defined and discussed in detail in the next section, all data nodes and branches are required to be numbered according to the following rules:
a. For any IFO branch, its output node's No. should be greater than its input node's No.; b. For any data node, the No.(s) of its out-branch(es) should be greater than the No.(s) of its in-branch(es). Here a node's in-branches/out-branches represent those IFO branches ending/starting at the node.
IV. INFORMATION FLOW CALCULATION
In this section, we discuss how to calculate the information flow, i.e., , using our IFO network model.
A. Features of Information Flow and Calculation Strategy
As mentioned in equation (18), the information flow can be expressed as a data mapping from the roots (measurement results z) to the leaves (final control command signals y), which is quite similar to the unidirectional distribution power flow. However, a key difference between them should be noted. In the steady-state phasor power flow model, transmission lines are abstracted as impedance components, so the relationships between the voltages and currents are linear (but the AC power flow model is non-linear). Such a feature is the basic prerequisite to the superposition theorem. However, some data-processing modules in an IFO network can be nonlinear (e.g., DP branches for SE and tertiary voltage control decision functions). In our research, these branches are defined as non-linear branches. Accordingly, we can also define linear branches. If the model generated contains one or more nonlinear branches, we call it a non-linear IFO network (NLN); otherwise, it is a linear IFO network (LN). Obviously, the latter is much easier to address. Therefore, we first propose a calculation approach for LNs and then extend it to NLNs.
B. Information Flow Calculation for an LN
In a radial distribution system, the current flowing out of its substation is equal to the algebraic sum of all paths' current injections. Similarly, in an LN, the node information can also be regarded as the union set of the data contributions of all directed paths ending at it, which can be transformed into an algebraic sum using equation (25) . Based on this idea, we first explain the way to assess the contribution of a single path to a data node and then calculate the entire information flow. 
where F ρ,1 , . . . , F ρ,k represent the mapping operators of  branches b ρ,1 , . . . , b ρ,k , respectively. Here, we define the ordered addition operator for the operators F ρ,1 , . . . , F ρ,k to describe the impact of the sequential actions of cyber modules:
Even though such an addition algorithm does not obey the commutative law, it still works after we number all the nodes and branches according to the rules presented in the last three paragraphs in Section III. Such numbering rules can ensure the correctness of the order for all branches in our matrix-based computation for the information flow.
According to equation (29), only a nonzero v in ρ may contribute to the information flow. Considering that only the root nodes can have external data injections, i.e., the virtual signals transformed by measurement terminals, we only need to consider those paths starting at the roots in our calculation, which we defined as root-paths.
A brief example is shown in Fig. 2 . In this cyber network, there are three root nodes, z 1 , z 2 , and z 3 , and a leaf node, y 1 . The root-paths for the leaf y 1 are at the bottom of the figure.
According to equation (29), the information flow from roots z 1 , z 2 , and z 3 to the leaf y 1 should be (30), by generating the path-branch incidence matrix T v and path-starting-node incidence matrix S v based on equations (26) and (27) , (1 j M v ) can be expressed as: (1 i n, 1 j l) in Q can be calculated with
According to equation (32), the node information in an LN can be obtained by merging all paths' contributions, that is,
Particularly, as only root-paths may contribute to the information flow, we can ignore the others to help reduce the computing complexity. Selecting submatrix S root v from S v corresponding to the roots, equation (35) can be simplified as
Equation (36) can describe the data mapping from the roots to any data node v È y w. Therefore, the information flow of the entire IFO network, modeled in equation (18), can be calculated via the following equation:
Therefore, for an LN, we have di agÔF
Take the IFO network in Fig. 2 as an example to briefly illustrate the derivation of equations (32)-(37) for information flow calculation. Define the mapping operators of the six branches b 1 . . . b 6 as F 1 . . . F 6 . We have
According to the IFO network structure, we can obtain pathbranch incidence matrix T y and path-starting-node incidence matrix S y for leaf node y 1 : 
The information flow from roots z 1 , z 2 , and z 3 to the leaf y 1 can be reformulated in the following form:
which is exactly the same as equation (36).
As the external characteristic of an HCS is determined by its signal inputs and command outputs, an IFO network or a sub-IFO network can be equated as a data mapping from its roots to the leaves according to equation (37).
C. Information Flow Calculation for an NLN
In an NLN, even though the non-linear data-processing branches may only account for a fraction of the total, they could seriously complicate the information flow calculation process because equation (29) is not applicable for the paths containing non-linear branches, thus invalidating the approach previously proposed in equations (29) -(37).
Electrical circuits may similarly contain non-linear elements. Two common methods for dealing with them are piecewise linearization and external equivalence. Referring to these two methods, we propose the following two approaches to address the non-linear branches in the NCN:
1) Linearization on Non-Linear Data Mappings:
Locally, linearization has already been widely applied to assess the impacts of data attacks on power information systems and has been verified to provide satisfactory accuracy. For example, Choi, and Xie [24] simplify the complex non-linear state estimation function into a linear one, then assess how different cyber-attacks affect the estimation results and control decisions using matrix operations.
Therefore, we can also reduce the non-linearity of the cyber network by a proper linear approximation on those non-linear branches. Specifically, for any non-linear IFO branch b N L 1 whose mapping function is:
Its Jacobian matrix can be written as:
with which b
can be approximately transformed into the following linear one:
where γ N L 1 is a constant vector. If all non-linear branches can be linearized, an approximate calculation can be performed using equation (38) .
2) Minimum-Cut-Set-Based Partition and Equivalence: Unavoidably, some non-linear branches with high non-linearity may not be able to be linearized. In this case, even though we cannot avoid non-linear calculation, we can perform a partition and equivalence on the IFO network model to reduce the computational complexity just like the Thevenin equivalence on an external circuit is used to address the non-linear components in the circuit analysis.
The core idea of this approach is to split the whole NLN into as few sub-LNs as possible and equivalently simplify them using equation (38) . By this mean, even though we still cannot avoid non-linear calculation, the scale of the non-linear part can be remarkably reduced without affecting the information flow. The partition and equivalence process can be performed via the following steps: a) For an IFO network G Øz, w, y; BÙ, if there is a non-linear branch b N L 2 , search for a minimum cut-set K B containing this branch and split the original network into two separate ones, G 1 Øz 1 , w 1 , y 1 ; B 1 Ù and G 2 Øz 2 , w 2 , y 2 ; B 2 Ù, which should meet two requirements:
b) After the system partition, a sub-network's relationship to the others can be expressed as the data mappings in the cut-set K. Defining the input and output nodes of any
, the information flow (see equation (18)) can be equivalently transformed to
c) If both sub-networks are LNs, the information flow in equations (45) and (46) can be calculated using equation (38); otherwise, we can perform steps a) and b) on the non-linear ones until all the sub-networks are LNs. The iteration time should be no more than the number of non-linear branches.
With this method, the information flow of an NCN can be accurately obtained by computing several comparatively less complicated information flows. In addition, our minimum-cutset-based partition and equivalence approach ensures minimum information interactions between different sub-networks, thus helping to reduce the computing complexity. As linear branches usually occupy the majority of branches in an HCS, the computing cost of our proposed approach should be acceptable.
D. Information Flow With Cyber Contingencies/Attacks
According to our previous research [5] , even though cyber contingencies may have different causes, they can uniformly be represented in terms of delay, content change, missing data, etc., in the proposed IFO network model. Therefore, the impact of a cyber contingency can be described as a modification of the original information-energy flow. As an NLN can be transformed into LN(s) during the calculation, we take a data injection attack on an LN as an example to demonstrate how to calculate the impact of a cyber contingency on the information flow.
Assume that there is a data injection attack on data node v i , which modifies its value to v i '. According to equation (37), the variation of node v i 's value can be regarded as The impact of such a cyber contingency on the information flow can be calculated by
z q are the column vectors of matrices S z 1 ¤ ¤ ¤ S z q corresponding to node v i . When dealing with NLNs, based on the system partition and equivalence results, we only need to use equation (49) to modify the sub-network where the contingency occurs and then substitute the modified results into the general model.
V. CYBER-PHYSICAL SENSITIVITY AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
The sensitivity is defined as how much one intra-system quantity affects another. For example, in power system analysis, the reactive power-voltage sensitivity index describes how much a bus voltage would change if we adjust the reactive output of a generator. Such index is widely applied in power system control and vulnerability analysis. Similarly, to assess the significance of a cyber quantity, for example, a data node, we propose a cyber-physical sensitivity index to describe the impact of a cyber quantity/contingency on the physical side as well as their interactions.
For an IFO network G Ø z, w, y; BÙ, based on the general information-energy flow model f ÔxÔN 1Õ, ¤ ¤ E ¤ xÔNÕ, DÔN 1Õ, η, AÕ 0, (50) the sensitivity index between any cyber quantity λ È G and selective physical state variables x È x (denoted as sÔλ, xÕ) can be calculated by the equation
where S P H Ôu, xÕ is the physical sensitivity index between the control variables and state variables, is the mapping matrix that appeared in equation (9), and yß λ refers to the contribution that a cyber quantity λ makes to the values of leaves inside the cyber network. Similarly, we can also define sÔx, λÕ, which describes the impacts of physical quantities on virtual information values.
To be specific, the core idea of calculating yß λ is to extract the key sub-network with a proper partition and equivalence, while ensuring that λ belongs to the new roots. In this way, the value of yß λ can be obtained by computing the information flow of the equivalent sub-network with the method discussed in Section III. A brief example is presented in Fig. 3 . To calculate y 1 ß w 2 , we can extract the key sub-network shown at the right side of the figure. If the sub-network is an LN, y 1 ß w 2 is the partial derivative of equation (37) with respect to w 2 . Otherwise, we can calculate the information flow of the extracted NLN (i.e., the data mapping from the new roots w 2 , z 3 to the new leaf y 1 ), defined as y 1 Ôw 2 , z 3 Õ, from which y 1 ß w 2 can be directly obtained by the perturbation method. Especially, if (part of) w 2 is a digital signal, in consideration of its binary nature, z 1 ß w 2 is defined as follows:
Referring to the sensitivity analysis approach to a power system, we can quickly assess a cyber contingency's impact on the physical side using sÔλ, xÕ,
where ε λ is the error of the cyber quantity λ.
According to the sensitivity index, we can also define the significance index for any cyber quantity λ È G:
It is noteworthy that SI(λ) may have different values under different physical operation scenarios. If SI(λ) is equal to zero, it means that such a cyber quantity does not affect the physical side at all.
VI. CASE STUDY In this section, we utilize our proposed approach to calculate the information-energy flow and perform a sensitivity analysis for a cyber-physical power system. After that, a comparison is established to verify the effectiveness of our approach.
The cyber system we choose, or the HCS application, is the Real Time-Voltage Stability Monitoring and Control (RT-VSMAC) system discussed in [26] , and a set of simulation results on cyber-attacks' impacts in [18] are introduced as a reference. Liu et al. [18] designed a cyber-physical simulation tool to analyze the cyber-physical impacts of different cyber events on the RT-VSMAC application for the IEEE 14-node system, in which the physical and cyber systems are respectively simulated using RTDS and NS-3.
In this paper, what we want to achieve is to perform a rapid steady-state assessment by quantitative calculation, rather than to realize an EMS function or to simulate it. Therefore, in our study, considering that the control period (5 s) is far longer than the durations of both the electro-magnetic transient and communication, we generate an information-energy flow model for the system. In this model, the physical-side power network is modeled as an AC power flow, and the cyberside HCS is modeled as an IFO network according to the flow chart presented in [26] and the communication model presented in [18] . Specifically, the optimal dispatch function in HCS is designed based on the "Voltage Stability Assessment Index (VI)" discussed in [27] and the emergency mode for the voltage stability control (VSC) function described in [26] .
A. Information-Energy Flow Model
The physical system we choose is again the IEEE 14-node system with a control period of 5 seconds. There are two capacitors/reactors with capacities of 1 MVar and 2 MVar in each bus. Considering the requirements of real application, the maximum load shedding in a control period is set as 20% of the current value to ensure the system's stability.
According to the functional flowchart presented in [26] , we can generate the information-energy flow model for the studied system with the method proposed in Sections II to V. A brief schematic diagram of it is shown in Fig. 4 . Four parts of the information-energy flow model are detailedly developed as follows: 1) Energy Flow: The energy flow model can be constructed according to the model discussed in equations (1) - (12) .
Among the five variables in equation (12), A, η, D and x have been defined in subsection III. A). As for the controllable variables, according to design of RT-VSMAC system, u refers to load shedding and the operation on two capacitors/reactors. Therefore, we define:
where for each 1 k 14
2) Energy Flow Information Flow: After introducing systemic error σ k ÔNÕ which follows the Gaussian distribution, we can generate the data mapping of the measurement step based on equation (14):
in which
3) Information Flow Energy Flow: The control command a substation receives from the control center includes the load shedding amount and the operation signals for the local capacitors/reactors' switches, which should have the following form:
Referring to equation (19) , the physical control equation can be formulated as follows: The IFO network that describes the information flow of RT-VSMAC application is presented in the middle of Fig. 4 . Two non-linear modules, the SE and VSC functions, are labeled by red-frame boxes in the figure. To balance the computation accuracy and efficiency, we linearize the SE module and set the VSC branch as a minimum cut-set partitioning the cyber network. Two sub-networks (G1, G2) are marked by different background colors (i.e., yellow and green), and the new root and leaf node(s) are labeled by dotted boxes. In this way, the whole information flow zÔNÕ yÔNÕ
ÔzÔNÕÕ,
can be partitioned into three sequential computable mappings:
3) G2: RootsÔG2Õ y 2 (Roots(G2)) in which mapping 2) is exactly the function of RT-VSMAC, and mappings 1) and 3) can be calculated using equation (38).
B. Operation Scenario and Cyber Contingencies
During the first 30 seconds, the load at buses 9, 13, and 14 gradually increased to different degrees. Referring to the scenario of the man-in-the-middle attack (MITM attack) described in [18] , the attacker manipulates the measurements, or specifically the voltage angles of buses 9, 13, and 14, during the information transmission from the substations to the control center. Based on the cyber contingency model discussed in [5] , we can modify the mapping functions of some DT branches that represent data transmissions from these three buses to the control center by adding error vectors when N 7, 8, 9, and 11.
C. Effectiveness and Accuracy of Information-Energy Flow
In our study, the information-energy flow states for 16 control periods are calculated in 34.41 seconds, which is only approximately twice the time of the 16 AC power flow computations using Matpower 4.1. This should be considerably less than the simulation time of the physical-side RTDS, let alone the cyber-physical simulation time. After calculation, we compare the voltage magnitudes and angles of buses 9, 13, and 14 with and without cyber contingencies in Fig. 5 , in which the solid lines and shadow areas represent the system operation states with and without cyber contingencies, respectively. The graphs in Fig. 5 are almost the same as Figs. 7 and 12 in [18] , except for some minor value differences, which BUS 14 may be caused by the difference between the physical models and the optimal dispatch functions, as well as the linearization of the SE function. Table I presents a detailed comparison between our calculation results based on the informationenergy flow model and the simulation results of bus 14, which is most seriously affected by the cyber-attack.
Both the information-energy flow computation results and the simulation results show that the voltage dips and VI increases caused by the load increases can be eased by proper voltage control. And the similarity between them verifies the effectiveness and accuracy of our method. However, the MITM attack could mislead the control center with greater VI values, thus increasing the operation pressure as well as the loss load. As only the load sheddings on bus 9 and bus 14 are affected by the attack, we perform sensitivity and vulnerability analyses only on these two buses in the following analysis.
D. Cyber-Physical Sensitivity and Vulnerability Analysis
Sensitivity analysis is one of the most efficient approaches to evaluate the impacts of a disturbance or error. According to [26] , the indicator of the local voltage stability control is the VI of each bus, and the RT-VSMAC application will not stop load-shedding until all buses' VIs fall below the alarm value. In other words, how the cyber contingencies affect the final system state is equivalent to how much extra loadshedding could make up for the contingencies' impacts on the VI computation. Therefore, we decided to focus on the sensitivities related to the VI and to explore how quickly the load sheddings of bus 9 and bus 14 can be estimated under different cyber-attack scenarios (e.g., different voltage angle errors) based on the original data.
1) Methodology and Sensitivity Indices: In this CPS, both the measurements and load distributions could affect the VIs' values. According to equation (53), the sensitivity-based computational approach of VI is generated as follows: 
in which θ k ß L i can be obtained from the Jacobian matrix of the power flow equation, and sÔ θ k , V I k Õ can be calculated based on the information flow equation of the generated IFO network.
The results for bus 9 and bus 14 are presented in Table II .
2) Cyber-Physical Sensitivity Analysis: After obtaining the cyber-physical sensitivity indices, we calculated the total load shedding amount of bus 14 under five-degree angle errors with equation (53) (considering a one degree error on bus 9), only based on the results without cyber-attack (i.e., 36%). The total calculation time for all five scenarios is less than 1 second. The results are presented in Table III .
In Table III , the sensitivity analysis result under the fivedegree angle error is quite close to the simulation result, which verifies the effectiveness of our approach and indices. The minor difference is mainly because the physical sensitivity between the bus voltage and bus load should decrease with the load curtailment, so more load needs to be shed to adjust the VI.
Obviously, the sensitivity analysis is less computationally expensive than the information-energy flow calculation, let alone the cyber-physical simulation. Admittedly, our sensitivity analysis approach sacrifices some accuracy, but it is acceptable for the macro scanning and assessment of a large cyber contingency set of a complex large-scale cyber-physical power system because of its high efficiency.
3) Cyber-Physical Vulnerability Analysis: Based on previous analyses, we can obtain the significance index of the voltage angle to the system load, namely, S I Ô θ 9 Õ Such a vulnerability analysis can be verified by our information-energy flow computation results. According to Fig. 6 , the attacks on bus 14 always result in more load curtailments than the attacks on bus 9 with the same angle changes, which agrees with our previous analysis. The main reason for this phenomenon is that the increase of bus 9's VI caused by a data attack can be partially offset by the original load-shedding of bus 14, while the VI increase of bus 14 can only be decreased by extra local load-shedding.
VII. CONCLUSION
To quantitatively and rapidly assess the operation state of a cyber-physical power system in this paper, we have expanded current power flow analysis theory and proposed an information-energy flow model as well as a matrix-based computational approach for it. To achieve better efficiency, we introduced a path-branch incidence matrix to describe the cyber network and proposed a minimum-cut-set-based partition and equivalence method for non-linear branches by splitting a complex cyber network into several sub-networks that can be computed separately. Based on the model, we can also perform a cyber-physical sensitivity analysis to evaluate the coupling relationships among different cyber/physical quantities.
To illustrate the concepts and methods, we used our modeling and computational approach studying a RT-VSMAC application. We also made a comparison between our steadystate information-energy flow analysis results and simulation results. Their similarities verified the validity and high efficiency of our information-energy flow and cyber-physical sensitivity analysis approach. In addition, with the calculated sensitivity indices, we can rapidly estimate the physical impacts of different cyber contingencies based only on the normal state data.
Similar to power system analysis, flow-based steady-state analysis may sacrifice some accuracy compared with transient simulation, but its negligible consumption of resources and time makes it suitable for the macro assessment of a large cyber-physical power system. The computed results can also act as a complement and an effective explanation for the simulation-based cyber-physical assessment results.
